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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

matter jurisdiction was properly invoked, a party's failure to comply
with a procedural requirement could justify the court's dismissal of
that action. A procedural requirement, service must be accomplished
upon all proper and necessary parties. The court held that actual
service, however, rather than its timing, perfected the appeal.
Accordingly, because the thirty day service of notice requirement was
procedural, plaintiffs failure to timely serve the three parties did not
require dismissal of the action.
CarolinePayne

CONNECTICUT
Albahary v. City of Bristol, No. CV 970482781, 1999 WL 185131
(Conn. Supp. Mar. 16, 1999) (holding that a statute authorizing the
City of Bristol's condemnation of an easement on plaintiffs' property
was constitutional because it was enacted for the legitimate and public
purpose of complying with a Consent Order).
In 1995, the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection
("CDEP") entered into a Consent Order with the City of Bristol
("City"). The City agreed to investigate and study the damage to a
city-owned landfill that was leaking contaminants. The Consent
Order did not require the City to clean up the contaminants. Instead,
the Consent Order required the City to take control of all affected
land within the contamination's zone of influence. The Consent
Order defined the zone as the area where leachate and ground water
mixed, or could potentially mix.
The Albahary's land bordered the landfill and was deemed within
the contaminated zone. In 1996, the Connecticut General Assembly
enacted Special Act 96-12 ("Special Act"). The Special Act allowed for
condemnation in those cases involving city-owned landfills when the
condemned land was outside a municipality's corporate limits. In
August of 1997, pursuant to the Special Act, the City began
condemnation proceedings to acquire an easement onto Albahary's
land. Albahary challenged the constitutionality of the Special Act,
seeking to have the Special Act declared invalid, unconstitutional, and
against public policy.
The court first noted that the constitutional issue was dispositive.
If the court found the Special Act unconstitutional, the need to
address Albahary's additional arguments was obviated. The court
found the Special Act to be constitutional and valid.
The court pointed out that any legislation for the economic or
social welfare of its constituents would be constitutional if there were a
rational and legitimate state purpose. If the Special Act met this twopart test, then it satisfied the due process requirement. Here, the
Special Act met the two-part test. Albahary did not contest the validity
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of the Consent Order mandating acquisition of all water rights
affected by contamination. The Consent Order itself served a public
purpose in trying to assure clean water. Therefore, the City's attempt
to comply with the Consent Order was for the benefit of the public.
The Special Act facilitated the fulfillment of the Consent Order, and
was therefore enacted for a legitimate purpose.
Albahary next argued that the Special Act only permitted the City
to take ground water rights, not easement rights. Because the Special
Act did not mention the word easement, Albahary argued that by
taking easement rights, the City exceeded the express authority of the
Special Act, thus rendering the condemnation ultra vires. Conceding
there was no express language regarding easements in the statute, the
court relied on the traditional view that ambiguous statutes must be
construed to satisfy the legislature's purpose. The court determined
that it was plain from the legislative history that the City was not
limited to the water rights of the property. The court thus held the
City had statutory authority to acquire an easement necessary to
comply with the Special Act's purpose. Therefore, the court allowed
the City to condemn an easement across Albahary's property.
Finally, Albahary argued that the taking was statutorily prohibited
by General Statutes which provide that a municipality may take only a
fee simple interest in private property. The court first stated that
nothing prohibited the legislature from authorizing less than a fee
interest in property. The court next pointed out that the Special Act,
authorizing taking of ground water or rights or interests therein, could
reasonably be interpreted as allowing a condemnation of less than fee
interest. Accordingly, the City's condemnation of the Albahary's
property under the Special Act did not violate the General Statutes.
Kim Shropshire

Middlefield Citizens Action, Inc. v. Middlefield Inland Wetland, Nos.
82372, 85259, 82830, 83209, 1999 WL 195882 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999)
(holding an agency did not receive ex parte information when it
received technical information from its engineer explaining a perched
water table).
White Water Mountain Resorts of Connecticut ("White Water")
runs Powder Ridge Ski Area in the winter. To expand its business to
include summer sports, White Water intended to build a summer
water park adjacent to the ski area.
White Water applied to the Town of Middletown Planning and
Zoning Commission ("Commission") for a special permit to create the
park and the road. During the mandatory public hearings, the
Commission created the special permit's conditions, which primarily
addressed traffic problems. The Commission subsequently approved
the permit.

